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It is common practice in the study of comparative
local government to treat certain systems as proto-
types, from which other systems derive their
structure and diverge on account of local condi-
tions or the peculiarities of national decentralisa-
tion. British and French precedents have long held
a prominent place, justifiably on grounds of their
influence through colonial experiment and con-
tinuing interest to independent states. Other
systems have more recently attracted attention in
developing countries, such as those of American
and Irish management, and that of Yugoslavia as
an Eastern European type, separable from the
highly integrated structure of national communist
governments. These references afford an attrac-
tive basis for relating similarities and contrasts,
and identifying potential areas of difficulty
and effective responses. The close reference
of the Malaysian Royal Commission's recom-
mendations in 1968 (Government Printer, 1970)
to those of the Maud Committee in England are
a case in point. It nevertheless remains a fact that
the models that have tended to attain prominence
have on the whole evolved under conditions very
different from those prevailing in the Third World,
tending to make their 'lessons' of controversial
if not of a merely hypothetical value!
In view of such limitations it would seem advan-
tageous to focus greater attention on the experi-
ence of states attaining independence within the
last 20 years, and particularly on those which have
chosen to emphasise the importance of their local
government structure, frequently following a
period of rejection of what was perceived as part
of their colonial legacy. The success of their
measures is in most respects too early to appraise.
Their approach and changes of emphasis are, in
contrast, aspects of considerable current relevance,
more comprehensible and hence useful to others
seeking forms of devolution appropriate to their
own priorities. Ghana, India, Malaysia, Nigeria,
the Sudan and Tanzania are among the nations in
question, and it is with the third that this article
is concerned. It is not suggested that the
Malaysian experience is one to be emulated; rather
that the structure now emerging has interesting
implications, calling into question some orthodox
reactions.
1 A full account of local government reform in Malaysia
appears in the authors Local Goeernment in Peninsular
Malaysia, Saxon House. (forthcoming).
An important aspect of the Malaysian Reform,
styled the 'restructuring' of local government, is
the absence of consistent articulated objectives. In
Nigeria, pressures for public participation follow-
ing a prolonged period of military rule, for the
distribution of newly acquired wealth, and for
more autonomy within a large federal nation, so
avoiding an excessive proliferation of states, have
all contributed to the form of the new local
governments. In Tanzania the restoration of the
former urban authorities is presented as an
appropriate reaction to a dc-emphasis of urban
needs established by earlier policies. Malaysia's
reform in contrast appears as a compromise
between conflicting reactions to what had become
a discredited local government structure.
From the outset devolution is constrained by cer-
tain factors, notably by the perception of a Malay
hegemony, which the Malay majority regard as
indispensable to internal peace, and, associated
with this, by the respect for state government
sensitivity, especially in matters which are con-
stitutionally of exclusive state concern. Neither is
consistent with an elective, representative form of
local government, at least so long as unbalanced
ethnic population distribution creates localised
Chinese majorities, frequently with opposition
sympathies. The power and prestige of the federal
and state public services deprive the third tier of
scope and expectations of initiative. Notwithstand-
ing, there exists a demand for representation,
strongly voiced in the evidence collected for the
Royal Commission in 1965-66, originating not
merly from party ambitions, but from an associa-
tion With values predominantly but not exclusively
western. Indians, in particular the late Senator
Athi Nahappan, Chairman of the Royal Commis-
sion, have been prominent spokesmen for elective
democracy. Participation and involvement, though
outside an elective system, was strongly urged by
the late Premier Tun Razak shortly before his
death, arising from his perception that the
integrity of the Malaysian state could only be pre-
served on a foundation of public identification and
commitment (speech to the National Seminar on
Local Government, 30 June 1975). The relevance
of local authorities as agencies to ensure a
balanced distribution of public services, partic-
ularly in a rapidly developing nation with powerful
single and multi-purpose public corporations, has
been persistently pressed by the Ministry for Local
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Government.
As a compromise a system is emerging of con-
siderable apparent promise, circumscribed by state
control. Wide publicity has been given to the
reform, exceeding the substance of current
achievements. On one side the 1976 Local Govern-
ment Act and Planning Legislation (Acts 171/76
and 172/76) have given local authorities the
powers to be primary agents of government both
in local planning and service provision, though
excluding education and police. Local government
is intended to cover all areas of Peninsular
Malaysia, in marked contrast to the fragmented
character of the earlier municipalities, town
councils, town boards, and local councils. Yet
by ensuring that all councillors are nominated by
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A street scene in Moiacca. Western Malaysia.
the state, and that most presidents or chairmen
are civil servants, and by securing powers of state
tutelage including abolition of unsatisfactory
councils, democratic risk is avoided, if at the cost
of reducing much of the popular appeal of the
programme. The reform is accordingly treated by
many critics as formalistic.
Yet recent developments should not be so readily
dismissed. They are firstly a practical response,
avoiding predictable local authority versus state
conflict that destroyed the effectiveness of several
of the earlier municipal and town authorities.
Political exclusion of the opposition gives Federal
and state governments an interest in promoting
the reputation of their own nominees; local effec-
tiveness reflects on the National Front Party.
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Experience so far does not indicate that the
councils are necessarily passive. Penang Island is a
case where many of the appointed councillors not
only opposed the state over the Penang urban
centre, but raised such severe criticism of the
revaluation exercise as to drive the Chief Minister
to hurried changes within the authority.2 The
remedy lies in state hands, but is apparently no
guarantee of compliance. Also the introduction in
the councils of much stronger Malay representa-
tion, on the whole a more confident political
element, is likely over the long term to ensure
more effective demands on the higher tiers. The
objection can be raised, as in some of the Johor
district councils3 that genuine public representa-
tion is distorted in favour of a balance of interests
between the components of the ruling party. While
in principle this may not be democratic, in practice
it is not necessarily disadvantageous to effective
local pressure.
The appointment of civil servants as authority
heads has positive as well as negative aspects.
Experience has already shown that several have
become strong advocates of their authorities,
Seberang Perai being an excellent example. Pub-
lished statements such as "with the potential that
local authorities have in helping the people to
achieve national aspiration both socially and
economically, it will be a sad waste of a very
efficient and effective link between the govern-
ment and the people . . . if the government does
not heed the call for help made by the local
authorities" would hardly have been written had
the civil servant concerned not been placed in a
position of direct responsibility for the Council
(Noh, 1977: 13). The traditional role of the
district officer as supervisor has tended to confer a
detached, superior and superficial acquaintance
with local government affairs. This is no longer
the case, as there is personal career interest in
promoting the welfare of the authority. The public
service pressure group can be effective, and is far
more likely to be given a sympathetic hearing, as
proved at Ipoh. This important municipality has
an impressive history of effective local govern-
ment, though in the past under the leadership of a
regional opposition party and despite consequent
local/state tension. Following the abolition of
elected representation, a politician was nominated
President. His deputy, however, was the former
State Finance Officer, who in fact carried out a
2 Certain aspects of this corporation are described by Phang
Slew Nooi (1978: 142-9).3 Representations from the Chinese MCA Party, a
component of the National Front, concerning the distri-
bution in Kulal were published in The New Straits Times,
12 January 1976.
wide range of the President's functions. The
marked improvement in communication, in the
rapid processing of municipal applications, and in
constructive reactions to requests was confirmed
by senior officers experienced in the authority's
affairs. The issue is whether in a particular stage
of institutional development such appointments
are not only the most politically acceptable, but
are also in the long term interests of local authori-
ties. The environment of the 1960s with inadequate
local revenues, weak support services, discrimina-
tion by other agencies and a general official neglect
will not easily be tolerated.
Another major aspect of the reform, and one in
which change is now far advanced, is that of
areal reorganisation. The solution of a federally
inspired blueprint, though offered by the Royal
Commission on the basis of adopting the majority
of district areas as authorities, has been rejected.
In accord with the need to accommodate state
priorities, each state has been encouraged to evolve
its own solution according to broad guidelines,
offered as advice by the Ministry for Local
Government. Reactions have in consequence been
mixed, ranging from an acceptance of the district
structure in Selangor, to a partial district structure
in Kedah, confined to those districts where finan-
cial and administrative viability seemed attainable
on account of an existing populous centre, to at
least a provisional rejection in Johor of several
of the existing district boundaries in favour of
new areas and the adoption by Penang of two
authorities only, inspired by city-region concepts.'
As a consequence the new authorities have a sur-
prising range and diversity of resources and
capabilities.
Weaknesses in the new areas have been identified,
notably the failure of authorities at this stage to
deliver services, or to retain effective communica-
tion with areas far larger than in the past. Diffi-
culties have predictably arisen, particuarly in
Penang, involving the relations of district officers
with appointed chairmen of authorities where
boundaries do not coincide. It is too early to draw
conclusions on the merits of the courses chosen,
and diversity complicates the task of overall com-
parison and performance measurement at the
federal level. On the other hand. given the fact
that this is a period of experiment, there are argu-
ments in favour of a number of contrasting solu-
tions, the progress of which can be compared.
4 The authorities of Penang Island and Seberang Peral
contain the extensive rural hinterlands of Georgetown and
Butterworth respectively. The solution was discussed with
foreign consultants In 1971.
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Allowance is made for local demands and needs,
and the state governments have not been faced
with a fait-accompli. The contrast with recent
Nigerian experience is very marked. It may be
claimed that the more recent the reorganisation,
the more seriously it has been examined, and the
states have tried to take advantage of others'
experience. Given the fact that areas are not static
and that the ideal, if attainable at all, is only
achieved at a particular time and for particular
ends, the approach adopted has considerable
merits. This may be asserted despite the slow
application to their tasks adopted by several states,
either from administrative inertia or an absence
of financial resources to support any significant
change.
Reference to finance focuses on a further major
aspect of the reform, and in some respects its most
defective. With irrefutable thoroughness the 1968
Commission drew attention to the parlous state of
the then existing authorities, only four of which
had any significant resources and accordingly a
cadre of senior professional staff. All authorities
depended on property rating and fees as their
major local revenue sources, the former seriously
constrained by the difficulties of revaluation,
political interferencenot infrequently from the
state level5and collecting from low value pro-
perties. The range of fees charged was limited by
the narrow scope of the services provided. Grant
aid was minimal, except in a few states such as
Johor where significant balancing grants were
given to the numerous local councils. The under-
lying principle accepted was that of 'financial
autonomy', the capacity to support recurrent
expenditure and debt charges with local revenues
alone. The Royal Commission urged more efficient
collection of sources, but in addition a more
generous and rational approach to grant aid by the
higher tiers. The subsequent Royal Commission
under Justice Harun in 1974 emphasised a reduc-
tion in scope of services to accord with local
resources, though supporting realistic financing of
essential local services. The 1976 Act altogether
rejected the latter approach, greatly enhancing
expectations without significantly increasing the
revenue base, at least in terms of available
sources. Expectations of local government involve-
ment in profitable enterprises are at best specula-
tive.6
An important aspect of areal restructuring was
S As, for example, in Johor Bahru in 1971 following
revaluation undertaken by the Valuation Division of the
Treasurr.6 Apart from issues of internal competence, such activities
overlap with, and indeed conipete with, those ol the State
Economic Development Corporations.
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the assurance by the Minister of additional aid to
reformed authorities in terms of both launching
and recurrent grants. Progress in implementing
these benefits has been exceedingly slow despite
two high level committees. Much discontent has
inevitably followed. Property revaluation, though
approached with courage in some towns, provoked
an internal crisis in Penang Island, and has in
practice secured only moderate gains in no way
consistent with growing needs. Agreement on
increased grants is at least being reached, though
gradually and with marked lack of enthusiasm
by the Treasury. In many states the Ministry is
accused of having 'put the cart before the horse'
in the restructuring process. This has been unques-
tionably the greatest weakness of the reforms,
reducing the functional opportunities to illusion,
and condemning the new councils to a dangerous
period of public disappointment.
On the other hand it may be argued that the
Malaysian experience, though neither planned nor,
indeed, initially intended, is in some respects pre-
ferable to a conspicuously more generous
approach. The traumatic experience of the
Nigerian Local Governments, created with
immense financial expectations, urged to ambitious
capital programmes and the elimination of
reserves, only to be faced with sudden and severe
retrenchment has in no way been risked. Many of
the new authorities have enjoyed little more than
the merged resources of their component parts,
notwithstanding far greater demands. Gains have
been the reward of struggle both by the Ministry
and the more articulate councils. The authorities
have been compelled to apply themselves to
revenue earning activities and the reduction of
needless expenditure. Local government bodies as
a whole have been led to increased interest
in the technology of revenue earnings. The
valuable seminar on property rating, seminar
Kadaran at Kuala L u m p u r, 1977, is an
example. Constraint is leading to incremental
improvements, though in places quite significant
as reflected in the increase of professional specia-
list staff at Butterworth, headquarters of the
Seberang Perai Authority. Provided that the pre-
sent demand continues to be rewarded, albeit
slowly, the effect may prove rewarding over the
medium term. As with other features of the
reforms, aspects which appear dysfunctional may
bring more beneficial consequences.
In no respect is this optimistic interpretation more
justified than in the Ministry for Local Govern-
ment itself. The office of the Commissioner of
Local Government was, until 1968, staffed by the
Commissioner himself, two clerks and an office boy.
Criticised by the Harun Commission for the inade-
quacy of its resources (Government Printer, 1972
para. 112), the Ministry has been greatly
reinforced by senior staff, some with considerable
experience. Its approach has become active, pro-
moting and holding seminars and conferences at
national and state level, and establishing direct
communications with the authorities in order to
use its own limited funds to best effect. The pro-
gress of positive reforms owes a great deal to the
efforts of Ministry officials, the effective survival
of the Ministry itself depending on the vitality of
the system it is intended to represent. A conclu-
sion of limited success has to be judged against the
strength of apathy to reform, found not only in
the majority of the states, but in the major
agencies of Federal Government. It is interesting
that a Ministry can promote its own programme
so effectively, in an environment where the
Federal constitution precludes the creation of a
strong Ministry with powers to direct the states.
It is appropriate, in conclûsion, to return to the
initial statement. No attempt has been made to
discuss the qualities desired in a local government
system. To some the present Malaysian structure
is no more than a form of guided democracy, a
pretence at devolution. The purpose of this
appraisal is to suggest that reform in such a case
is not directed to a clearly perceived end. It is a
process creating its own opportunities, releasing
forces in its evolution capable of influencing the
course of its development and even of its longer
term objectives. For the first time in its history
Peninsular Malaysia has a nascent group of inter-
related local authorities, protected by positive
legislation, given widespread notice, and asso-
ciated in their success with both the ruling party
and elements in the civil service. Neither Federal
nor state governments have cause to suspect the
third tier, though they may prefer to ignore it. The
situation is, at the least, interesting, more par-
ticularly for those in the throes of comparable
compromise and uncertainty.
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Erratum
The IDS Bulletin, January 1979, vol. 10 no. 2, contained an article entitled
"Appropriate Methodology: an Example Using a Traditional African Board Game
to Measure Farmers' Attitudes and Environmental Images", in which reference
was made to a modified version of the Mancala Board, called the Atteh board. The
author would like to point out that this board was built by C. G. Knight and
J. Flinn and has been extensively used by them in Nigeria. lt was kindly made
available by them for the work described in the paper. The author apologises
for any misunderstanding which may have arisen from the nomenclature used in
the article.
